06 January 2011 11:22 [Source: ICIS news]
(Adds comments from Halliburton in paragraphs 11-15)
LONDON (ICIS)--BP said on Thursday it had instituted significant changes designed to further strengthen safety and risk management following the release of a ?xml:namespace>
The report said that “most of the mistakes and oversights at Macondo can be traced back to a single overarching failure - a failure of management”.
“Better management by BP, Halliburton and Transocean would almost certainly have prevented the blowout by improving the ability of individuals involved to identify the risks they faced, and to properly evaluate, communicate, and address them. A blowout in Deepwater was not a statistical inevitability,” it added.
The report said that decision-making processes at the Macondo well did not adequately ensure that personnel fully considered the risks created by time- and money-saving decisions.
“Whether purposeful or not, many of the decisions that BP, Halliburton, and Transocean made that increased the risk of the Macondo blowout clearly saved those companies significant time (and money),” the report said.
“The problem is that, at least in regard to BP’s Macondo team, there appears to have been no formal system for ensuring that alternative procedures were in fact equally safe,” it added.
BP said in a statement that it supported the commission's efforts to determine the causes of the Deepwater Horizon accident, and had co-operated fully with its investigation.
The UK-based oil major said that even prior to the conclusion of the investigation, it had instituted significant changes designed to further strengthen safety and risk management.
“These changes include the creation of a new Safety & Operational Risk division, reporting directly to group CEO Bob Dudley, that will provide independent oversight of operational decisions involving safety," said BP.
The company added that the commission’s findings also supported its own internal investigation, which concluded that "the accident was the result of multiple causes, involving multiple companies”.
Halliburton said the report acknowledged that cementing an oil well “is an inherently uncertain process and things can go wrong even under optimal conditions”.
However, it added that a cement bond log test (CBL) is the only means to test the integrity of the cement bond and said BP chose not to run the CBL.
“Had BP properly interpreted the negative tests, the tests would have revealed any problems with the cement job,” said Halliburton in a statement.
“Halliburton acted at the direction of BP, as acknowledged in several places in the National Commission report. The report also acknowledges the restraints BP put on our cement design,” it said.
It added that it felt the commission had selectively omitted information provided to them in response to their numerous inquiries.
No-one from Transocean was immediately available for comment.
The explosion on the Deepwater Horizon oil rig on 20 April 2010 killed 11 workers. It caused a huge oil leak, which led to the pollution of the shoreline and disruption to fishing, before the leaking well was successfully plugged in August.
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