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The following text is from a white paper published by ICIS called Trump peace talks bring further uncertainty over Russian oil and LNG sanctions. You can download the pdf version of this paper here. Written by: Aura Sabadus, Barney Gray, Andreas Schroeder, Rob Songer As US president Donald Trump pushes for Ukrainian-Russian peace negotiations, it is uncertain whether he might seek to strengthen or unwind some of the sanctions imposed on Russian oil and LNG over the last three years. Trump has also been pursuing a blend of tariffs and sanctions, complicating an already difficult landscape. This latest ICIS paper proposes to help companies navigate a complex environment, reviewing the impact of new tariffs and existing sanctions on markets, the likelihood that they may be scrapped and asks whether unilateral European sanctions on Russian oil and gas could be just as effective.  INTRODUCTION US President Donald Trump’s second term has ushered in a whirlwind of economic measures sparking volatility across markets and shaking the global economy. Since his return to power at the end of January, US trade policies have focused on a blend of tariffs and sanctions targeting import partners, Canada and Mexico but also political adversaries, Iran and Venezuela. From this vantage point, his wider economic measures have the potential to spur inflation and a global economic slowdown that could weaken energy demand at a time of surging global oil and gas supply, weighing heavily on prices. With events unfolding at rapid speed as policies are announced and rolled back within days or even hours, it is becoming increasingly difficult for companies to assess the direction that oil and gas markets will take in the longer-term. Perhaps the biggest wild card in this unpredictable environment is the US’ position on Russian oil and LNG sanctions. On 7 March, the US president said he was strongly considering an array of tariffs and sanctions on Russia but many observers do not exclude the possibility of a u-turn on restrictions as Washington has been doubling down on efforts to conclude a peace deal with Moscow over Ukraine. These sanctions could be eased either during peace negotiations or once the war ends. SANCTIONS AND LOOPHOLES Since Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, the US together with the EU and the UK imposed over 20,000 sanctions, targeting primarily its oil sector. Nevertheless, despite the sweeping sanctions, Russia still made close to €1tr in oil and gas sales since the start of the war, as the two account for up to half of Russia’s tax revenues, according to estimates from the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air (CREA). Although the US and the EU introduced limited restrictions on Russian LNG, the country lost most of its European pipeline gas market share after cutting close to 80% of its exports following the invasion of Ukraine. Following the expiry of the Russian-Ukrainian pipeline gas transit agreement at the beginning of 2025, the Russian share of LNG and gas in Europe is 11%. Since then, the shortfall has been plugged primarily by the US, which now accounts for nearly a quarter of European gas supplies. RECORD IMPORTS In January alone, a record 58% of LNG imported into Europe came from the US, while Russia’s market share including pipeline and LNG exports accounted for 11%, dropping from close to 40% in 2021. While Europe has become increasingly dependent on the US, the same could be said about the US, as 80% of its LNG exports have been heading to Europe in recent months, according to ICIS data. With US LNG production set to double in the second half of this decade, unwinding sanctions against Russia’s Arctic LNG2 project would create direct competition to US producers. In contrast, by removing some of the sanctions on the oil sector, the Trump administration might hope to offset the inflationary effect of tariffs through falling oil prices and greenlight the return of US companies to Russia. Meanwhile, with the EU and the UK pledging to weaken Russia economically as part of efforts to help Ukraine negotiate from a position of strength, the onus would be on Brussels and London to continue sanctions on their own but that raises questions about their effectiveness. An EU transshipment ban prohibiting the transfer of Russian LNG via European terminals could have the perverse impact of redirecting these LNG volumes into European markets when it comes in force at the end of this month. Last year, more than 50% of Russian LNG exports ended up in Europe, which means that with the trans-shipment ban even more volumes could enter the market just as the EU is preparing to announce a roadmap for the scheduled 2027 Russia fossil fuel import phaseout. TARIFFS Donald Trump’s administration has had a profound impact on the global crude market in only a few short weeks. His mix of tariffs on friendly countries and sanctions on adversaries have led to ramped-up volatility and uncertainty with a distinct bearish tinge. Tariffs against Canada and Mexico announced in February, paused for a month and reintroduced in March only to be suspended again, have sparked fears of a global trade war. Canada is the US’ largest source of imported crude, representing over 4 million barrels/day or 62% of total imports in 2024. US refiners rely on Canada’s heavier, sour grades for which many US Gulf Coast refiners are specifically adapted to process. The US has placed a tariff of 10% on Canadian imports, adding more than $5/barrel to the current cost of Canada’s Western Canadian Select export grade. This will adversely impact refiners’ margins and may encourage them to seek replacement barrels from overseas, boosting demand for non-tariffed Middle Eastern or Brazilian grades. While the majority of Canada’s export pipeline infrastructure is dedicated to serving US customers, Canada is likely to ramp up exports through its Trans Mountain pipeline on the Pacific coast targeting Asian customers. Such a move could compete with Middle Eastern exports to Asia as higher volumes of Canadian grades find their way to South Korea, China and Japan. US tariffs on Mexican imports are a more punitive 25%, impacting around 465,000 barrels/day. While Mexican imports could dip in the short term, most Mexican production is coastal and offshore, and the country has the option to reroute exports more readily than Canada. However, with Mexico’s OPEC+ partners starting to return 2.2 million barrels of production cuts to the market over the next 18 months from April, surplus Mexican oil on the global market is likely to pressure prices. Meanwhile, with OPEC+ seeking to increase monthly production by around 138,000 barrels per day, US sanctions will try to remove supply from Iran. Iranian production dipped sharply under Trump’s first term only to rally again during president Biden’s tenure to 3.26 million barrels/day in 2024. While US sanctions could pare this back by 1.0 million barrels/day, offsetting global supply gains elsewhere, it is likely that this number is optimistic as consumers in China and India continue to ignore US sanctions on Iran. The US is likely to be more successful sanctioning Venezuelan imports which currently average around 220,000 barrels/day. Since Trump cancelled Chevron’s license to operate in the country, imports of Venezuelan oil are now likely to cease completely with these barrels competing in the global heavy, sour market. RUSSIAN SANCTIONS US president Donald Trump's tariffs and sanctions policies so far this year have weakened oil prices. These policies, along with likely increased supply of competing grades from Canada, Mexico and the Middle East, mean medium and heavy-sour benchmark oil prices could weaken even further this year. One implication is that president Trump may sacrifice the growth of the US oil sector for lower oil prices as a net benefit to the US economy. Should he also relax sanctions on Russia, the prospect of up to 0.6 million barrels/day of spare capacity hitting the market comes closer to reality, which could tank prices. What decision the Trump administration takes regarding Russian oil and gas will be pivotal for global markets, determining not only immediate price movements but also the long-term direction of the industry. Recent diplomatic events suggest the US is sympathetic to Moscow’s cause, as it pushes for an immediate peace deal with Ukraine. Many observers say that lifting sanctions could be detrimental to US oil and LNG producers and could have major oil price downside. Since the start of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, western partners, including the US, UK and the EU have introduced over 20,000 sanctions against Russia, expecting to dissuade it from pursuing its aggression against Ukraine. Most of these sanctions target its oil and LNG sectors, which account for more than a third of Russia's annual revenue. They took the form of either sanctions on production and services, or a price cap designed to limit revenue while not creating global supply imbalances. These were bolstered by a comprehensive package introduced in the final days of the previous Biden administration, directed at 183 oil tankers, some of which overlap with the 90 vessels blacklisted by the UK and another 80 sanctioned by the EU. Since the G7 plus Australia introduced a $60/bbl cap on the price for seaborne Russian-origin crude oil, prohibiting service providers in their jurisdictions to enable maritime transportation above that level, Russia has built a shadow fleet of tankers stripped of ownership, management and flagship to help circumvent the restrictions. It spent over $10 billion in acquiring the vessels and is thought to have earned around $14 billion in sales, according to CREA. CREA also noted the comprehensive sanctions on oil production might cut up to $20 billion from Russia’s oil and gas revenue forecast of $110 billion this year. Following tougher US sanctions introduced earlier this year, India and China halted the purchase of Russian oil.  But the effectiveness of sanctions lies not only in their enforcement but also in the perception that they would be imposed. With Donald Trump driving the US increasingly towards Russia, that perception will be diluted, raising questions about the effectiveness of the sanctions in the longer-term. LNG SANCTIONS To date, the most wide-reaching sanctions to be imposed on Russian LNG ships and infrastructure have been through the US treasury. The most significant European sanctions, clamping down on LNG ship-to-ship (STS) transfers in European ports, come into effect at the end of March and are intended to reduce Russia’s ability to supply its Arctic LNG to markets outside Europe. However, they could result in increasing European imports of Russian LNG, since less will be able to be exported. To minimize disruption to the US’s European allies, US treasury sanctions did not target the established 17.4 million tonne per annum (mtpa) Yamal LNG and 10.9mtpa Sakhalin 2 liquefaction plants. Nor did they initially target much Russian shipping, although this soon followed. HITTING LNG PRODUCTION Instead, measures were aimed squarely at the 19.8mtpa Arctic LNG2 (ALNG2) liquefaction plant, which was sanctioned before it had loaded a commercial cargo, as were two giant brand-new floating storage units (FSUs), each with a storage capacity of 362,000cbm. These two FSUs, named Saam and Koryak, were intended to be installed as storage hubs at Murmansk in Europe, and Kamchatka in Asia, respectively, allowing laden Arc7 ice-class vessels to shuttle cargoes away from icy conditions, so they could be reloaded via STS transfers onto more lightly winterised vessels. In keeping with the theme of sanctions targeting new, rather than existing Russian infrastructure, four newbuilds built by South Korea’s Samsung Heavy Industries (SHI) called North Air, North Way, North Mountain and North Sky were all sanctioned, preventing them from being put to work at the neighbouring Yamal LNG facility. However, four more vessels also intended to perform this role but arriving slightly later from another South Korean shipyard – Hanwha Ocean – have only recently been delivered. As a result, these four vessels – called North Moon, North Light, North Ocean and North Valley –  managed to escape the last of the Biden-era sanctions and are being used for Yamal LNG STS operations. The operator of Arctic LNG2 turned to smaller, older vessels to try to circumvent the loading ban, and these vessels – which were characterized by regular changes to their names, flags and byzantine ownership structures – were also sanctioned. Finally, in January 2025, the outgoing Biden administration slapped sanctions on existing liquefaction plants for the first time, seemingly calculating that their small sizes would not greatly inconvenience buyers. These were the 1.5mtpa Portovaya midscale and 0.66mtpa Vysotsk small-scale liquefaction plants, along with two Russian-owned vessels, the Gazprom-chartered Pskov, since renamed Pearl, and Velikiy Novgorod, which Gazprom used to load Portovaya cargoes. As it stands, some 15 LNG vessels are the subject of US treasury sanctions, according to ICIS LNG Edge, including Saam and Koryak. It should also be noted that less specific sanctions targeting technology transfers have also meant that five Arc-7 carriers that were being completed in Russia’s Zvezda shipyards, their hulls having been built in South Korea by SHI, are yet to be commissioned, two years after they were supposed to be delivered. In addition, a further ten SHI hulls have since been cancelled, which will likely slow down future Arctic LNG projects planned by Russia. Given the Trump administration’s current cordiality to Russia and antagonism towards Ukraine, it seems unlikely at this stage that further sanctions on LNG vessels will be implemented. Instead, it is arguable that existing sanctions now stand more chance of being rolled back. The sanctioned vessels are as follows: UNWINDING SANCTIONS? With the US pivoting towards Russia, there are two questions that will dominate discussions in global oil and gas markets: Will the US unwind the sanctions imposed so far and, if so, can unilateral European sanctions be equally effective? Alexander Kolyandr, a sanctions specialist and non-resident senior fellow at the Washington-based Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA) said several conditions must be taken into consideration. Firstly, with Trump’s tariff policies likely to lead to inflation that would hit both his blue-collar Rust Belt electorate and tech companies in California, lifting some sanctions on Russian oil production could pressure crude prices, offsetting the impact of tariffs, he said. As steep price falls could hit current and future oil output, such a measure would have to be weighed against the interests of US producers. Kolyandr said the blacklisting of Russian oil companies Gazprom Neft and Surgutneftegas has a relatively minor impact because their combined production is around one million barrels per day, or less than a tenth of Russian overall production. More critical are sanctions against the so-called shadow fleet that has been carrying 78% of Russian seaborne crude oil shipments in in 2024, according to a report by the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air (CREA). When EU and UK sanctions are added to those imposed by the US, the number of blacklisted oil tankers increases to 270, around a third of Russia’s shadow fleet. APPROVAL Kolyandr said another factor that will determine the unwinding of US sanctions is ease of removal. “Some sanctions derive from CAATSA (Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act), which need Congressional approval and are more difficult to remove and some were introduced through emergency acts, which are easier to unwind,” Kolyandr said. Although sanctions against Russian LNG are limited in scope, the likelihood of removing them, particularly against the Arctic LNG2 project , is lower as adding more LNG to a production glut that is expected to build up in coming months would hit US producers. However, it is unlikely the US Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) will seek to expand the scope of sanctions beyond Arctic LNG2 and the smaller Portovaya and Vysotsk to the bigger Yamal LNG and Sakhalin II exports as these would create major disruptions in a global LNG market set to remain tight in the mid-term. EUROPEAN SANCTIONS If the US did unwind critical sanctions against Russia’s oil and LNG shadow fleets as well as against oil production, could European measures prove as effective? Some observers believe that a possible US exit from the G7 price cap would not pose a problem to Europe because most of the Russian oil dodging the cap is exported via EU-controlled chokepoints in the Baltic Sea, giving the bloc leverage to control and enforce the cap. Russian LNG exports are equally critically dependant on European insurance. In 2024, 95% of LNG volumes were transported on vessels insured in G7 + countries. More than half of these vessels belonged to UK and Greek companies, making them vulnerable to European leverage, according to CREA. Ongoing price volatility and tight market conditions expected for the rest of the year will likely leave the EU unable to join the UK in banning Russian LNG imports, at least for the time being. However, the EU could work with Ukraine to ban remaining land-based oil exports to Hungary, Slovakia and Czechia via the Druzhba pipeline. The expansion of the Transalpine Pipeline from Italy to the Czech Republic could help replace some of the volumes transiting Ukraine. FINANCIAL MARKETS To restart Russian oil and gas operations, western companies would need access to markets, where the major global financial centres of the EU and UK could also exert pressure. On March 13, there were reports that a waiver introduced by former president Joe Biden exempting 12 Russian banks used for oil payments may have lapsed on March 12 without being renewed. As the waiver lapsed, the May Brent future price fell below $70/bbl but regained some of the lost premium the following day to hover around that level. Kolyandr said that in the case of Gazprombank, which had received a separate exemption to allow payments from pipeline gas buyers from Turkey, the waiver may still be on for now. By: Barney Gray, Aura Sabadus, Andreas Schroeder, Rob Songer

14-Mar-2025

LONDON (ICIS)–Senior Editor for Recycling, Matt Tudball, discusses the latest developments in the European recycled polyethylene terephthalate (R-PET) market, including: Colorless flake prices rise in Italy and Spain High feedstock bale costs still a concern Hopes for improved pellet demand from Q2

14-Mar-2025

SINGAPORE (ICIS)–South Korea is initiating full emergency response measures as US steel and aluminum tariffs take effect, aiming to mitigate the impact on its economy, which is already grappling with weak exports and domestic consumption. US reciprocal tariffs, automotive tariffs to bite Hyundai Steel enters emergency mode due to tariff-induced financial strain 2024 export surplus at risk as global tariff war escalates The South Korean Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy (MOTIE) convened a meeting with stakeholders on 12 March to strategize in response to the US' newly implemented 25% tariffs on steel and aluminum imports. The MOTIE meeting was organized to "further strengthen the joint public-private emergency response system in preparation for the US administration's steel and aluminum tariff measures, the anticipated imposition of reciprocal tariffs in early April, and tariffs on specific items such as automobiles", the ministry said in a statement. "We will further strengthen the response system ahead of the anticipated imposition of reciprocal tariffs in early April and do our utmost to protect the interests of our industry," industry minister Ahn Duk-geun said. "We will closely conduct high-level and working-level consultations with the US, including the head of the Office of Trade, and monitor the response trends of other major countries to minimize any disadvantages to our industry," he added. South Korea's trade minister Cheong In-kyo is currently in the US from 13 to 14 March to discuss trade issues including reciprocal tariffs and investment projects with his counterparts, MOTIE said in a statement on 12 March. Cheong will meet with officials at the US Trade Representative for consultations on the tariff issue, as well as investment plans by South Korean companies in the world’s biggest economy. According to data from the US International Trade Administration (ITA), South Korea was the fourth-largest exporter of steel to the US last year, accounting for 9% of Washington's steel imports. The northeast Asian country was also the fourth-biggest exporter of aluminum to the US, comprising about 4% of US aluminum imports. Hyundai Steel Co, South Korea's second-largest steelmaker after POSCO, has entered emergency management mode due to increasing market pressures, local media reported on Friday. The company has implemented a 20% salary reduction for all executives, effective 13 March, according to South Korean news agency Yonhap. Further measures include a review of voluntary retirement options for staff, along with plans to drastically reduce operational expenses, including limiting overseas travel. The US tariffs on all steel imports have significantly worsened the company's financial outlook, the Korea Times said. EMERGENCY EXPORT MEASURES The South Korean government on 18 February announced emergency export measures consisting of four pillars: tariff responses; a record won (W) 366 trillion ($253 billion) in export financing; export market diversification; and additional marketing and logistics support. South Korea is a major importer of raw materials like crude oil and naphtha, which it uses to produce a variety of petrochemicals, which are then exported. The country is a major exporter of aromatics such as benzene toluene and styrene. Government officials have expressed concern that export conditions are expected to worsen considerably in the first half of the year but improve in the second half, defining the current situation as “an emergency” and “the last opportunity to maintain the export growth momentum”. South Korea achieved record-breaking exports and a trade surplus in 2024, with exports reaching $683.7 billion and the trade balance showing a $51.6 billion surplus. A major concern is increased risks amid the trade protectionist stance of the US under President Donald Trump which could trigger a full-scale global tariff war. In February, South Korea’s export growth inched up 1% year on year to $52.6 billion, accompanied by the first decline in chip exports in 16 months which offset strong automobile and smartphone shipments. "The first half of the year is expected to be particularly difficult for exports due to the convergence of three major challenges: the launch of the new US administration, continued high interest rates and exchange rate volatility, and intensifying competition and oversupply in advanced industries," according to S Korea’s government ministries. Concerns include falling prices of major export items and a decrease in import demand in key markets as well as expectations of weak oil prices following the end of production cuts by OPEC and its allies (OPEC+) and the US pro-fossil fuel policies. South Korea’s slowing import demand, the US’ increased local production, EU’s electric vehicle market challenges and global contractions in manufacturing and construction markets are also causes for concern. These factors are expected to particularly affect exports of major items such as semiconductors, automobiles, petrochemicals, and machinery in the first half of the year. There are also worries about lower exports in critical sectors due to falling unit prices and oil prices, along with the risk of reduced demand in the US and EU for automobiles and general machinery due to market challenges and the contraction of the construction market. South Korea's GDP growth this year is projected at 1.5%, down from its previous estimate of 1.9% and lower than the 1.6% to 1.7% range indicated in January. For 2024, South Korea's final GDP growth was confirmed at 2.0%, matching the preliminary estimate released in January. The economy is experiencing a slowdown in the recovery of domestic demand, including consumption and construction investment, coupled with continued employment difficulties, particularly in vulnerable sectors, according to the Ministry of Economy and Finance's monthly economic report released in Korean on Friday. "While geopolitical risks persist in the global economy, uncertainties in the trade environment are also expanding, such as the realization of tariff impositions by major countries," it said. "The government will continue to work hard on supporting exports and responding to uncertainties in the trade environment." Focus article by Nurluqman Suratman Thumbnail image: Trade cargo containers at Busan port, South Korea – 1 February 2025. (YONHAP/EPA-EFE/Shutterstock)

14-Mar-2025

HOUSTON (ICIS)–The new administration of US President Donald Trump is giving chemical companies a break on regulations and proposing tariffs on the nation's biggest trade partners and on the world. RELIEF FROM RED TAPEThe new administration marks a sharp break from the previous one of the former president,Joe Biden. He proposed a wave of regulations towards the end of his administration that increased costs while providing little benefit to the chemical industry. Several proposed rules under that previous administration will likely fall by the wayside, said Eric Byer, president and CEO of the Alliance for Chemical Distribution (ACD), a trade group that represents chemical distributors. So far under Trump, the regulatory climate has been mostly positive, Byer said. Trump pledged to reduce regulations, and late in his campaign, said he would purge 10 regulations for every one introduced by his administration. The government is conducting earnest analyses of the economic effects of rules, something that the previous administration had glossed over, Byer said. LESS RIGID ENVIRONMENTAL RULESThe Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is reviewing how it evaluates existing chemicals for safety under its main program, known as TSCA. Among items it could review is the whole chemical approach that the agency adopted under the previous administration. That approach made it likely that the EPA would determine that a chemical posed an unreasonable risk. Such a finding would expose the chemical to more restrictions. For environmental regulations in general, the EPA announced numerous reviews of existing regulations that could have far-reaching effects on costs. The following lists some of the regulations under review: The National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAPs). The standards for chemical manufacturing will be among those that the EPA will initially review. The greenhouse gas reporting program. The Risk Management Program (RMP). One RMP rule compromised plant safety by requiring companies to share information that had been off limits since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, according to trade groups. The Technology Transitions Program. Currently, the program restricts the use hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), which are used to make refrigerants and blowing agents for polyurethanes. Terminating the environmental justice and diversity, environment and inclusion (DEI) arms of the EPA. Environmental justice has made it harder to build chemical plants. Particulate matter national ambient air quality standards (PM 2.5 NAAQS). The review could lead to guidance from the EPA that increases both the flexibility and clarity of permitting obligations for chemical plants, according to the ACC. A rule by the previous administration that intended to account for what it described as the social cost of carbon. The Waters of the US Rule. The EPA wants to review the rule to reduce permitting and compliance costs. ENDING FAVORABLE EV RULESThe EPA is reviewing the tailpipe rule that was adopted by the previous administration. The tailpipe rule gradually reduced the carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions of automobiles. Critics have said that this and other regulations from the previous administration were so strict, they acted as bans on vehicles powered by internal combustion engines (ICE). The EPA will also review the standards for model years 2027 and later light-duty and medium-duty vehicles. The Department of Transportation (DOT) wants to reset the Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards, which critics say unduly favor electric vehicles (EVs) by being too strict. SUPERFUND TAX MAY BE RESCINDEDThe Republican controlled government could repeal the Superfund tax, which was imposed in 2022 on several building-block petrochemicals and their derivatives. Confusion arose over how to calculate the taxes for the derivatives. The government also seems to lack the resources to administer the program. So far, legislators have introduced bills in both legislative chambers that would repeal the tax, including Senate Bill 1195 and House of Representatives Bill 640. These would likely need to be part of a larger tax bill. Byer of the ACD said the repeal will not be easy. However, it does have a chance to succeed, and the effort is getting traction among legislators. The ACD, the ACC and the American Fuel & Petrochemical Manufacturers (AFPM) were among the trade groups that signed a letter urging Congress to repeal the tax. TARIFFS POSE RISK TO CHEMSThe tariffs adopted and being proposed by the US could increase costs of imports of steel and aluminium needed to build new plants and repair existing ones. They also increase the costs of minerals used to make catalysts as well as regional imports of plastics and chemicals. US tariffs also expose its chemical industry to retaliatory tariffs. US tariffs could cause short term logistical disruptions because companies will be re-arranging supply chains to avoid the taxes and to secure materials from new suppliers that could be farther away. "I think we will see some near-term reconfiguration of moving products because of the tariffed countries, predominantly China, Mexico and Canada," Byer said. "Either way, people will reconfigure. My hope is that the reconfiguration part will only last a few weeks to a few months at most so we can get back to just doing straight on trade deals and supply chain movements without to deal with tariff stuff." Hosted by the American Fuel & Petrochemical Manufacturers (AFPM), the IPC takes place on 23-25 March in San Antonio, Texas. Insight article by Al Greenwood Thumbnail Photo: US Capitol. (By Lucky-photographer)

13-Mar-2025

Additional reporting by Luka Dimitrov Plans for new 1GW Albanian-Italian power cable will likely help with increasing Italian power demand The project also involves the development of 3GW of renewable capacity in Albania and up to 1GW of new data centers in Italy The interconnector is expected to be completed in 2028 LONDON (ICIS) – A new 1GW subsea power cable between Italy and Albania, expected to come online in 2028, is likely to boost Italian demand in upcoming years, traders told ICIS. “The feasibility study for the project is currently underway and the results will determine its prospects”, the Albanian energy ministry said at the start of March. On 15 January Italy, Albania, and the United Arab Emirates signed a cooperation deal to build a 1GW subsea power cable between Italy and Albania. The deal, valued at more than €1 billion, will connect the Albanian port of Vlore with the Italian region of Puglia, the narrowest point between Albania and Italy. NEW ALBANIAN RENEWABLES The project signed by the three countries includes the development of 3GW of new renewable capacity in Albania, a large part of which is to be exported to Italy via the undersea power cable. On 24 February, the Italian energy company Eni announced it had signed an agreement with the Emirati companies Masdar and TAQA Transmission to be “a preferred off-taker” of the new Albanian renewable energy transmitted to Italy. Hydropower currently accounts for almost all of Albania’s domestic electricity generation. “Albanian power producer KESH is every week looking to buy energy due to low hydro stocks. The new project with renewable build-up will be a game changer for Albania and KESH as it will save costs and boost exports,” a local trader told ICIS. Albania is currently a net importer of electricity, but its increasing renewable capacity and new interconnection with Italy could see it switch to a net exporter in upcoming years, Balkan traders said. Indeed, Albania’s Energy Minister Belinda Balluku claimed on social media that the agreement would “play a significant role in increasing the country’s energy capacities, as well as supporting Albania’s goal of becoming a net exporter”. RISING ITALIAN DEMAND Traders expect the new cable to boost Italian power demand, which is set to rise by 2030 driven by data centers, EV and industrial sector expansion. In 2024, Italy imported a net total of 79.6GW from Greece, 97.5GW from Montenegro, and 67.8GW from Slovenia. In 2025 so far, Italy has continued to import more electricity than it exports to the Balkans. This trend is likely to continue amid rising Italian demand. Italian power demand totaled 312.3TWh in 2024 according to the Italian TSO Terna, and is forecast rise to 355.7TWh by 2030, ICIS analytics shows. Italian data center demand is forecast to nearly double within the same time-period, rising from 3.64TWh in 2024 to 7.01TWh in 2030. In February, Eni also signed a letter of intent with the Emirati groups MGX and G42 to develop data centers in Italy with a planned IT capacity of up to 1GW.

13-Mar-2025

SINGAPORE (ICIS)–Click here to see the latest blog post on Asian Chemical Connections by John Richardson. The 1992–2021 Chemicals Supercycle was driven by unique conditions—China’s rapid expansion, globalization, and a massive, debt-fueled boom. That era is over. The industry now faces structural shifts that will reshape markets for decades. What’s different this time? Trade wars & protectionism – China’s economic slowdown is driving aggressive exports, leading to record antidumping measures on chemicals and polymers. Will the trend continue? Climate change & migration – Gaia Vince’s Nomad Century predicts 1.5 billion climate migrants by 2050. How will this shift global chemicals demand? Changing demand patterns – As industries relocate and cities adapt, will traditional GDP-driven demand forecasting still hold? These aren’t just short-term disruptions—they mark a fundamental shift in global petrochemicals. The companies that understand and adapt will be the ones that thrive. Waiting for a return to the old normal isn’t a strategy. The industry is changing—stay ahead of it. Editor’s note: This blog post is an opinion piece. The views expressed are those of the author, and do not necessarily represent those of ICIS.

13-Mar-2025

HOUSTON (ICIS)–Conflict has caused nations to adopt energy policies that favor security, affordability and reliability over sustainability as they seek to meet rising energy demand for artificial intelligence (AI) among developed countries and rising populations among developing ones. Energy security was brought to the fore by the war between Russia and Ukraine and the subsequent shock to EU industry, according to comments made at the CERAWeek by S&P Global energy conference. Executives at CERAWeek were exuberant about the prospects of rising demand for energy, particularly natural gas. Global demand for oil could reach a plateau by the middle of the next decade, although it could continue to rise as populations grow in emerging economies. RISING ENERGY DEMANDFollowing demand shocks such as war and COVID, governments want  sources of energy that are secure, reliable and affordable. "Energy realism is taking center stage," said Sultan Ahmed Al Jabr, CEO of the Abu Dhabi National Oil Co. (ADNOC). He made his comments at CERAWeek. "Sustainable progress is not possible without access to reliable, affordable and secure sources of energy." Murray Auchincloss, the CEO of BP, noted that every government to which he spoke after his appointment stressed the need for affordable and reliable energy. At the same time, the world will need more energy because of population growth, adoption of middle-class habits in emerging economies and AI. Applications like ChatGPT use up to 10 times the energy of a simple web search, Al Jabr said. By 2030, demand for power from data centers in the US will triple, accounting for 10% of consumption. ADNOC is putting money behind its predictions by establishing XRG, an energy investment company with an enterprise value of more than $80 billion. ADNOC and others expect LNG will play a large role in meeting growing demand for reliable and affordable power. Between now and 2050, LNG demand should rise by 65%, according to XRG. In fact, international gas is one of XRG's three platforms. US energy producer ConocoPhillips is also optimistic about the prospects for LNG, said Ryan Lance, CEO. He sees a growing market shipping low-cost natural gas from North America to higher cost regions in Europe and Asia. OIL HITS PLATEAUUnder current trends, global demand should continue growing slowly until reaching a plateau in the mid-2030s, said Helen Currie, chief economist of ConocoPhillips. In the industrialized world, oil demand is declining, said Eirik Warness, chief economist of Equinor. He expects oil demand to reach a plateau by the end of the decade. One factor behind tapering oil demand is China. It is weaning itself off of petroleum-based fuels in favor of nuclear and renewables for security reasons, said Jeff Currie, chief strategy officer for Carlyle. While these sources of energy have higher upfront costs, they have much lower operational costs when compared with fossil fuels, and they provide a secure source of energy. PROSPECT FOR US OIL PRODUCTIONCEOs at ConocoPhillips and Occidental Petroleum expect US oil production to reach a plateau later in the decade. After that, it should slowly taper using current technology. But energy companies have demonstrated a track record for innovation. If successful, they could extend the production life of US oilfields. Occidental is conducting pilot tests to determine whether it can use carbon dioxide (CO2) in unconventional oil fields like shale, said Vicki Hollub, CEO. The goal is to double oil recovery rates to 20% from 10%. Using CO2 in enhanced oil recovery is already an established technique in conventional fields, and Occidental is building a business around it using direct air capture (DAC). IMPLICATIONS FOR US CHEMSUS ethylene plants rely predominantly on ethane as a feedstock, and its cost tends to rise and fall with that for natural gas. At the least, rising gas demand could establish a floor on prices for the fuel and potentially lead to spikes as supply struggles to keep up with demand. At the same time, prices for petrochemicals tend to rise and fall with those for crude oil. Flat or falling demand for oil could set a ceiling on prices for petrochemicals. CERAWeek by S&P Global runs through Friday. Insight article by Al Greenwood (Thumbnail shows an LNG tanker. Image by Xinhua/Shutterstock)

12-Mar-2025

HOUSTON (ICIS)–The threat of additional US tariffs, retaliatory tariffs from trading partners, and their potential impact is fostering a heightened level of uncertainty, dampening consumer, business and investor sentiment, along with clouding the 2025 outlook for chemicals and economies. The US chemical industry, a massive net exporter of chemicals and plastics to the tune of over $30 billion annually, is particularly exposed to retaliatory tariffs. Chemical company earnings guidance for Q1 and all of 2025 is already subdued, with the one common theme from the investor calls being little-to-no help expected from macroeconomic factors this year. Tariffs only cloud the outlook further. Tariffs have long been a feature of US economic and fiscal policy. In the period to the 1940s, tariffs were used as a major revenue source to fund the federal government before the introduction of the income tax and were also used to protect domestic industries. After 1945, a neo-liberal world order arose, which resulted in a lowering of tariffs and other trade barriers and the rise of globalization. With the collapse of the Doha Round of trade negotiations in 2008, this drive stalled and began to reverse. Heading into this year’s International Petrochemical Conference (IPC) hosted by the American Fuel & Petrochemical Manufacturers (AFPM), it is clear that the neo-liberal world order has ended. Rising geopolitical tensions and logistics issues from COVID led many firms to diversify supply chains, leading to reshoring benefiting India, Southeast Asia, Mexico and others, and to the rise of a multi-polar world. It is also resulting in the rise of tariffs and other trade barriers around the world, most notably as US trade policy. FLUID US TRADE POLICYThe US administration’s policy stance on tariffs has been very fluid, changing from day to day. It is implementing 25% tariffs on steel and aluminium imports on 12 March and has already placed additional tariffs of 20% on all imports from China as of 4 March (10% on 4 February, plus 10% on 4 March). On 11 March, the US announced steel and aluminium tariffs on Canada would be ramped up to 50% in retaliation for Canadian province Ontario placing 25% tariffs on electricity exports to the US. Later, Ontario suspended the US electricity surcharge, and the US did not impose the 50% steel and aluminium tariff. The US had placed 25% tariffs on imports from Canada (10% on energy) and Mexico on 4 March but then on 5 March exempted automotive and then on 6 March announced a pause until 2 April. China retaliated by implementing 15% tariffs on US imports of meat, fish and various crops, along with liquefied natural gas (LNG) and coal. Canada retaliated with 25% tariffs on C$30 billion worth of goods on 4 March and then with the US pause, is delaying a second round of tariffs on C$125 billion of US imports until 2 April. Mexico planned to retaliate on 9 March but has not following the US pause. US President Trump has also threatened the EU with 25% tariffs. We have a trade war and as 1960s Motown artist Edwin Starr sang, “War, huh, yeah… What is it good for?… Absolutely nothing.” Canada, Mexico and China are the top three trading partners of the US, collectively making up over 40% of US imports and exports. The three North American economies, until recently, had low or non-existent tariffs on almost all of the goods they trade. This dates back to the 1994 NAFTA free trade agreement, which was renegotiated in 2020 as the USMCA (US-Mexico-Canada Agreement). A reasoning behind the tariff threats on Canada and Mexico is to force Canada and Mexico to stop illegal drugs and undocumented migrants from crossing into the US. These tariffs were first postponed in early February after both countries promised measures on border security, but apparently more is desired. But the US also runs big trade deficits with both countries. Here, tariffs are seen by the administration as the best way to force companies that want US market access to invest in US production. IMPACT ON AUTOMOTIVEUS automakers are the most exposed end market to US tariffs and potential retaliatory tariffs, as their supply chains are even more highly integrated with Mexico and Canada following the USMCA free trade deal in 2020. The USMCA established Rules of Origin which require a certain amount of content in a vehicle produced within the North America trading partners to avoid duties. For example, at least 75% of a vehicle’s Regional Value Content must come from within the USMCA partners – up from 62.5% under the previous NAFTA deal. Supply chains are deeply intertwined. In the North American light vehicle industry, materials, parts and components can cross borders – and now potential tariff regimes – more than six times before a finished vehicle is delivered to the dealer’s lot. US prices for those goods will likely rise. The degree to which they rise (extent to which tariffs costs will pass through) depends upon availability of alternatives, structure of the domestic industry and pricing power, and currency movements. In addition, some of the Administration’s polices dealing with deregulation, energy, and tax will have a mitigating effect on the negative impact of tariffs for the US. The 25% steel and aluminium tariffs will add nearly $1,500 to the cost of a light vehicle and will result in lower sales for the automotive industry which has been plagued in recent years by affordability issues. If it had been implemented, the 50% tariff on steel and aluminium imports from Canada would only compound the pricing impact. All things being equal, 25% tariffs on the metals would push down sales by about 525,000 units but some of the favorable factors cited above as well as not all costs being passed through to consumers will partially offset the effects of higher metal prices. Partially is the key word. Since so many parts, components, and finished vehicles are produced in Canada and Mexico, US 25% tariffs on all imports from Canada and Mexico would add further to the price effects. The economic law of demand holds that as prices of a good rise, demand for the good will fall. ECONOMIC IMPACTTariffs will dampen demand across myriad industries and markets, and could add to inflation. By demand, we mean the aggregate demand of economists as measured by GDP. Aggregate demand primarily consists of consumer spending, business fixed investment, housing investment, and government purchases of goods and services. Tariffs would likely add to inflation but the effects would begin to dissipate after a year or so. By themselves, the current round of tariffs on steel and aluminium and on goods from Canada, Mexico and China will dampen demand due to higher prices. Plus, as trading partners retaliate, US exports would be at risk. Preliminary estimates suggest the annual impact from these tariffs – in isolation – on US GDP during the next three years could average 1.4 percentage points from baseline GDP growth. Keep in mind that there are many moving parts to the economy and that the more favorable policies could offset some of this and, as a result, the average drag on GDP could be limited to a 0.5 percentage point reduction from the baseline. POTENTIAL GDP IMPACT OF US TARIFFS – 20% ON CHINA, 25% ON MEXICO AND CANADA Real GDP is a good proxy for what could happen in the various end-use markets for plastic resins and the reduction of US economic growth. In outlying years, however, tariffs could support reshoring and business fixed investment. The hits on Mexico and Canada would be particularly. China’s economic growth would be affected as well. But China can shift exports to other markets. Mexico and Canada have fewer options. Resilience will be key to growing uncertainty and will lead to shifting trade patterns and new market opportunities. This is where scenarios, sound planning and strategies, and leadership come into play. US EXPORTS AT RISK, SUPPLY CHAINS TO SHIFTUS PE exports are particularly vulnerable to retaliatory tariffs. The US is specifically targeting tariffs on countries and regions that absorb around 52% of US PE exports – China, the EU, Mexico and Canada, according to an ICIS analysis. Aside from PE, the US exports major volumes of PP, ethylene glycol (EG), methanol, PVC, styrene and vinyl chloride monomer (VCM), along with base oils to countries and regions targeted with tariffs. The US exports nearly 50% of PE production with China and Mexico being major outlets. China has only a 6.5% duty on imports of US PE, having provided its importers with waivers in February 2020 that took rates to pre-US-China trade war levels. The US-China trade war under the first US Trump administration started in 2018 with escalating tariffs on both sides, before a phase 1 deal was struck in December 2019 that removed some tariffs and reduced others. After the waivers offered by China to importers in February 2020, US exports of PE and other ethylene derivatives surged before falling back in 2021 from the COVID impact. They then rocketed higher through 2023 and remained at high levels in 2024. Since 2017, the year before the first US-China trade war, US ethylene and derivative exports to China are up more than 4 times, leaving them more exposed than ever to China. With tariff escalation, chemical trade flows would shift dramatically. Just one example is in isopropanol (IPA). Shell in Sarnia, Ontario, Canada, produces IPA, of which over 85% is shipped to the US, mainly to the northeast customers, said ICIS senior market analyst Manny Borges. “It is a better supply chain for the customers instead of shipping product from the US Gulf,” said Borges. “With the increase in tariffs, we will see several customers shifting volumes to domestic producers or countries where the tariffs are not applied,” he added. US IPA producers are running their plants at around 67% of capacity on average and have sufficient capacity to supply the entire domestic market, the analyst pointed out. This dynamic, where US producers supply more of the local market versus imports, would likely play out across multiple product chains as well, especially in olefins where the US is more than self-sufficient. Even as the US is more than self-sufficient in, and a big net exporter of PE, ethylene glycols, polypropylene (PP) and polyvinyl chloride (PVC), it imports significant quantities from Canada. In the event of a 25% tariff on imports from Canada, US producers could easily fill the gap, although logistics would have to be reworked. Hosted by the American Fuel & Petrochemical Manufacturers (AFPM), the IPC takes place on 23-25 March in San Antonio, Texas. Visit the US tariffs, policy – impact on chemicals and energy topic page Visit the Macroeconomics: Impact on chemicals topic page Insight article by Kevin Swift and Joseph Chang

12-Mar-2025

HOUSTON (ICIS)–Whether it is dealing with on-again, off-again tariffs, new charges at US ports for carriers with China-flagged vessels in their fleets, or booking passage through the Panama Canal, participants at this year's International Petrochemical Conference (IPC) have plenty to talk about. Last year, shippers were dealing with tight global capacity after carriers began avoiding the Suez Canal because of attacks on commercial vessels by Houthi rebels, the possibility of labor issues at US Gulf and East Coast ports, and fewer slots for passage through the Panama Canal as that region dealt with a severe drought. But 2025 has brought a new series of challenges that will keep logistics and supply chain professionals busy. TARIFFS The US has imposed tariffs of 25% on most imports from Canada and Mexico, effective 4 March, but US President Donald Trump said last week that tariffs on goods from Mexico and Canada that are compliant with the USMCA free trade agreement will be exempt until 2 April. It is unclear what shifts in trade flows will be seen once tariffs are fully implemented, but analysts at Dutch banking and financial services corporation ING still expect global trade to see solid growth amid trade tensions, geopolitical risks and economic nationalism. ING expects trade in goods to grow by 2.5% year on year in 2025, driven by heavy front-loading in the first quarter and increased intra-continental trade throughout the year. “While it is true that some countries heavily depend on the US market, such as Canada and Mexico, global trade is far more diverse and does not solely revolve around the United States,” ING said. According to the World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) data, which contains trade data among 122 countries, the US accounts for 13.6% of total global exports. Additionally, the reliance on raw materials and critical intermediate products that cannot be substituted, as well as new alliances and potential trade deals speak for continued trade in goods. STRATEGIES FOR ADAPTATION Chemical distributor GreenChem Industries offered suggestions that chemical companies could implement to mitigate the effects of tariffs. These include finding new sources for raw materials in regions with favorable trade agreements, modifying transportation routes and methods to lower costs and enhance efficiency, discovering more affordable chemical alternatives that maintain quality, reevaluating trade agreements to secure more competitive pricing, and investigating the potential for manufacturing within strategic markets to avoid extra costs. USTR HEARING ON NEW PORT CHARGES The office of the US Trade Representative (USTR) is accepting public comment on proposed actions against Chinese-owned ships after a Section 301 investigation determined China’s acts, policies and practices to be unreasonable and to burden or restrict US commerce. The proposal includes proposed service fees of up to $1.5 million per US port call for vessels built in China, and up to $1 million per port call for China-based operators. USTR is now accepting public comment and will hold a public hearing on the proposed actions on 24 March. Some market players feel the proposal is aimed at container ships, but a broker in the liquid chemical tanker space said that if the text of the prosed action remains unchanged, the China-built tankers comprising the fleets of shipping majors Stolt and Odjfell could be targeted. As of now, the proposal would include all commercial vessels calling on US ports. The West Gulf Maritime Association (WGMA) said that currently, there is not enough US inventory to meet the demand for maritime transport nor has the USTR suggested plans for meeting the projected demands. There is also not enough shipbuilding capacity within the US to construct the required hulls. Based on the draft executive order, the USTR will have no more than 180 days to implement the port fee collection program. The WGMA intends to individually and collectively submit comments against the proposed policy as written with recommendations, and they strongly encourage all shipping companies and vessel operators do the same through any means available to them. LIQUID CHEMICAL TANKERS Trade data from 2024 shows that about 25% of US liquid bulk exports and 21% of imports were carried on Chinese-built vessels, which will particularly impact the specialty chemical, vegetable oils and renewable fuels sectors. The fees would mean increasing the number of exports on US-flagged vessels and, given the limited existing US-flagged chemical tanker fleet, this will make any shortfall difficult to make up. Typically, it will take 24-36 months for construction of these type of specialized vessels, therefore the industry will face significant challenges in the meantime. These significant increases would most likely lead to a few different scenarios such as substantial rate increases, fewer port calls and potential supply chain disruptions for US manufacturers relying on specialty chemical imports. As a result, most owners and charterers are taking a wait and see approach while looking for longer term solutions. Liquid tanker spot rates hit their highest over the past decade in 2025 but have fallen from the peaks, according to ICIS pricing history. The following chart shows rates over the past year on the US Gulf-Asia trade route. CONTAINER RATES Rates for shipping containers from east Asia and China to the US have fallen considerable this year as capacity adjusted to diversions away from the Suez Canal and as newly built vessels entered the market. Judah Levine, head of research at online freight shipping marketplace and platform provider Freightos, said that the combination of a seasonal slump in demand and the possible end of frontloading ahead of tariffs likely drove the sharp fall in transpacific ocean rates recently. Container ships and costs for shipping containers are relevant to the chemical industry because while most chemicals are liquids and are shipped in tankers, container ships transport polymers, such as polyethylene (PE) and polypropylene (PP), are shipped in pellets. Titanium dioxide (TiO2) is also shipped in containers. They also transport liquid chemicals in isotanks. PANAMA CANAL Because of a severe drought that lowered levels in the freshwater lake that serves the Panama Canal, the Panama Canal Authority (PCA) was forced to limit daily crossings for the first time in its history. The drought was in part brought about because of the El Nino weather phenomenon, which contributes to less rainfall, especially during what is the typical rainy season. But weather patterns have shifted to La Nina, which brings increased rains and have helped levels at Gatun Lake approach capacity. Gabriel Mariscal, agency business manager at port service provider CB Fenton & Co, said the situation at the Panama Canal is completely different from a year ago. “We are not expecting to have any restrictions this year in regard to transit,” Mariscal told ICIS. “In fact, during a normal summer season, perhaps there could be a draft restriction at the Neopanamax locks, but I think that this year that will not be the case.” Mariscal said the PCA is updating regulations for customer rankings. Customer rankings consider the volumes a shipper moved through the canal over the previous 12 months, as well as the number of tolls they have paid. For example, if there are 10 slots for passage on a given day, and the PCA receives 20 requests for those slots, the higher-ranking customers will get priority. If a shipper is unable to book a slot in the first period (90 days before passage) or the second booking period (14 days before passage) then they go to the auction, where the highest bidder wins. Container shipping companies Maersk and MSC are the highest two ranked customers at present. Mariscal said Maersk has at least three vessels that transit the canal each day. PANAMA TENSIONS WITH US Mariscal said that the new presidential administration under Trump has caused some stress for the central American country. Because of this, he expects extreme care to be taken by the PCA when announcing new rules or regulations so as not to increase tensions. Trump surprised some shortly after his inauguration when he said that the US should reclaim the Panama Canal. A US congressman has since introduced a bill that would authorize the purchase of the Panama Canal. Trump threatened to reclaim the canal if Panama did not take immediate steps to curb what Trump called China’s influence and control over the vital waterway. Panama’s president said in early February the country will not renew its agreement with China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) after a visit from US Secretary of State Marco Rubio. Then, last week a consortium led by private equity firm BlackRock agreed to pay $22.8 billion for port terminal operations from Hutchison Port Holdings (HPH), which includes terminals in Panama. It was Hong Kong-listed CK Hutchison’s ownership of the ports at both entrances to the canal that likely concerned Trump. Hosted by the American Fuel & Petrochemical Manufacturers (AFPM), the IPC takes place on 23-25 March in San Antonio, Texas. Visit the US tariffs, policy – impact on chemicals and energy topic page Visit the Macroeconomics: Impact on chemicals topic page Visit the Logistics: Impact on chemicals and energy topic page Focus article by Adam Yanelli Additional reporting by Kevin Callahan Thumbnail image shows a container ship passing through the Panama Canal. Courtesy the Panama Canal Authority

11-Mar-2025

SAO PAULO (ICIS)–Brazil’s higher import tariffs for dozens of chemicals in place since October have already pushed up costs for industrial players, who are already passing those higher costs onto customers, according to the head at the trade group of industrial chemicals importers Associquim. Rubens Medrano, president of the Brazilian Association of Distributors of Chemical and Petrochemical Products (Associquim), which represents companies employing around 7,000 people across Brazil, would not make a prediction about whether tariffs will be lowered again in October – when the current 12-month measure is due to expire. But he did say manufacturing is feeling the pinch, adding that the international and domestic economic scenarios are worsening, and higher tariffs are not making life easier for the many companies in Brazil which import chemicals and petrochemicals – half of the large country’s demand for chemicals is covered by imports. Brazil’s several changes to chemicals imports over the years, depending on who is in government and whose lobbying policymakers listen to the most, has become a recurrent saga, and one that is certain to provide a few more acts. PRODUCERS GOT THEIR WAY ON TARIFFS – IS IT PAYING OFF?The current situation was meant to benefit domestic producers – of which there are not many, with the market being controlled by a few large players, most prominently polymers producer Braskem, Latin America’s largest petrochemicals producer. Higher tariffs, the narrative went, should encourage domestic purchases of chemicals, with the narrative quickly turning to protecting Brazilian jobs, one narrative the current government is very sensitive to. But Brazil’s 220-million person market requires many more chemicals than it produces domestically, making imports indispensable for many manufacturing firms to operate. This has been a constant feature over the decades as producers never got to specialize but stayed in the commodity – and prone to be hit by global downturns – chemicals market. In the current act in the tariffs saga, Braskem and its lobbying arm Abiquim have been the main characters, with their months-long lobbying paying off last year when tariffs were sharply increased. Or, at least, that was the thinking when the measure was implemented. The reality is proving stickier though: Braskem’s poor financial results in the fourth quarter, meant to be the first one to show positive effects from tariffs, called that theory into question. Unipar, the other large chemicals producer who lobbied via Abiquim for higher tariffs for the main chemicals it produces, is due to release its financial results later this week. Unigel, embroiled in its own financial woes as it restructures its debt aiming to keep afloat, has not published financial results since 2023. Associquim – and the trade group representing plastics transformers Abiplast – fell on the losing side of the last tariffs act. But as Abiplast’s president Jose Ricardo Roriz said in October, they will “continue to fight” to reverse the higher tariffs. A Brazilian senator has also started a campaign against the tariffs, with heated words towards Braskem and what he considered the firm’s market dominance. LET’S START 2025, THENOne of Brazil’s funniest and probably truthful sayings goes: “The year only starts in truth after Carnival” – which this year fell very late, with the last Carnival events only taken place last weekend. The economy does function in January and February, but at a slower pace. A summer pace: for most Brazilians, the saying is just part of the idiosyncrasy and responds to the sort of seasons: the summer is slightly hotter than other seasons. Kids are off school in January and those families who can afford it will holiday away. Lobbyists are already gearing up for their work as the year starts. A key date for them will be the revision of the tariffs in October, so expect to hear from them more in coming months as they lobby to reverse course. This interview with Associquim being an example of it. “Distributors do not import just for the sake of importing. We usually have the criterion that we import products that are not produced domestically. However, the increase in import tariffs, increasing input costs, ends up harming several end consumer companies,” said Associquim’s Medrano. “I don’t think that’s the solution… The companies in our association are already paying more and passing this on to the consumer, of course. We don’t work with thermoplastics – we represent players in the industrial products category, and electrochemical distributors. Any increase in import costs will represent an increase in the final cost. The Brazilian consumer will be the one to pay for this.” Medrano said Abiquim’s intense lobbying running up to October was healthy and legitimate action in a market democratic economy, where companies and their funded trade groups “try to show” to the government their side of the argument. Medrano declined to comment on whether Braskem’s Q4 results indicated that the tariffs had not had the desired impact. ‘DIFFICULT TIMES’ GLOBALLY – AND LOCALLYAs 2025 is about to enter is second quarter, a common consensus is forming: the global economy and the largest economy in Latin America are showing signs of fatigue, with manufacturing especially feeling the heat. The slowdown was taken for granted by most economists even without considering the US’ President Donald Trump proposed tariffs after storming into the White House in January. Trump’s trade policies could hit Brazil in many fronts. Trump views steel as the true sign of industrial prowess, and his proposed tariffs on that product could directly hurt Brazil, which keeps a healthy steel production which makes it a net exporter, with more than 3.5 million tonnes/year sold to the US. Another sector which could be hit is one of the country’s own success stories: ethanol, as Brazil overtakes the US as a global producer thanks to lower costs, hot weather, abundant water, and previous trade wars, which made the largest grain consumer China turn away from US farmers' output. Contributing to the doom and gloom, US credit rating agency Moody’s said in February the potential tariff-induced economic hit to Latin America’s economy would only be recouped by 2028, with lower output and lower employment on the cards. However, the expected economic slowdown could play in favor of those who are lobbying for lower tariffs. Despite the healthier-than-expected manufacturing performance in February, Brazil’s manufacturing has been on a slowing trend for months, and this does not play well with the music the government wants to sell to voters. A fall in jobs in manufacturing could greatly harm President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva's Workers’ Party (PT) chances of re-election in 2026, as that constituency forms the backbone of the party’s electorate. Amid yet another crisis in the many he has experienced, Associquim’s Medrano preferred to end on an optimistic note. “The global petrochemical industry is in trouble. Let’s see where we are in October, but a decrease in tariffs could take place – it will all depend on how the Brazilian economy behaves in the coming months. If the economy grows, there will be a shortage of products, making imports important in addition to the usual supply and demand patterns,” said Medrano. “Usually, at the beginning of the year, we see a replenishment of stocks as companies reduced their operations ahead of the summer break. This year, however, this replenishment of stocks has been lower and slower than normal. “We are living in difficult times. Not only nationally, but internationally. Adding to that, international trade is very disrupted and could even be more disrupted in coming quarters. Things are not normal, or at least not the normal we became accustomed to in past decades. “However, we have been through worse times and, for sure, we will get through them. I don’t want to be too pessimistic.” Finally, a quick note to readers in Brazil: happy new year. Front page picture: Port of Santos in Sao Paulo, Latin America’s largestSource: Port of Santos Authority Insight by Jonathan Lopez

11-Mar-2025